Religious Belief and Hume’s Philosophy of Common Life

Abstract

Acombination of agnosticism and natural suppositions sustains a philosophy of common life. Agnostic on how mechanisms of understanding function or how nature works, we can suppose that we adequately judge or that nature works steadily and continue from there. The problem Hume confronts in his conception of history arises from a conflict between his desire to be agnostic on questions about how things in history work on one hand and our need to put forth propositions about how history moves. The last chapter covered the difficulties of establishing the “common sense” principles for a study of history since every account of history presumes something about the meaning of history and what moves history. That he conceives of history as determined by accident implies an answer to the question of how history works and what moves history. As troubling, Hume’s own account lends support to the view that history is animated by a spirit of progress behind accidents that are on the surface. How should or can philosophy of common life proceed if or when non-controversial natural suppositions are not available?