Religions and philanthropies in Chinese societies

Abstract

The twentieth century brought drastic economic and political changes to China and Taiwan, as it did to much of the world. Unlike many places, however, Taiwan ended the century with a thriving market economy, an educated and well-off population, and democracy. China, in spite of its many problems, is emulating Taiwan's economic growth, if not its politics. In both places, a growing market economy has ushered in a boom in religion, rather than the secularization that earlier theory had expected. Village-based temple religion is thriving again in much of China and all of Taiwansometimes growing even beyond the scope it had in the late nineteenth century. Christianity is increasing rapidly in China, and quasi-religious groups like the Falungong rise up constantly. Such groups are common in Taiwan, too, along with very large new Buddhist movements that have successfully spread over the globe. This has occurred in spite of governments that had long been unfriendly to religion, and in spite of the loss of many earlier sources of religious revenue, like extensive land-holdings. Correlation is not causation, though, and it is worth examining just how economic development and religious growth have intertwined in these two cases. In principle, we can imagine three broad ways in which a relationship might take place. First, religions interact directly with the market and with the increased global cultural flows that result. They develop new financial strategies, new communicative possibilities (like television), and new ways of facing the pluralization of life worlds. This can sometimes lead to considerable religious transformation, as I will discuss. Second, religions can interact morally with the market through their ability to mold identities and behaviors. This is the realm, for example, of the post-Confucian hypothesis, which suggested that Confucianism, in some broadly defined sense, helped create the economic successes of the East Asian "dragons" Finally, religions can position themselves as alternatives to the market, occupying moral and economic ground that the market tends to downplay. They can claim to supply values that have otherwise been lost (providing the "heart of a heartless world," as Marx put it), and they can also foster an economy of charity and philanthropy as an alternative or supplement to the market. This strategy has been the key to the success, for instance, ofTaiwan's globalizing Buddhist movements. All three processes are at work in China and Taiwan, spinning off complex variants, but always showing how religion both shapes and is shaped by market growth and globalization. Background to Present