Religion as Illusion: Reversing the Freudian Hermeneutic

Abstract

Interpretations of Freud's work, particularly his metapsychological theories, have been enriched by an increased recognition of the contradictions, inconsistencies, and impasses that proliferate in his later writings.' Such recognition does not necessarily indicate a decreased respect for Freud's accomplishments. To the contrary, the numerous aporias of the metapsychological and cultural writings are indicative of the enormous creative tension that characterizes Freud's work and of a willingness to change tactics or suspend judgment as new insights qualify previous theoretical constructs. The hermeneutical approach engendered by such an appreciation of change and inconsistency militates against efforts to encapsulate psychoanalysis in rigid formulaic terms. Psychoanalytic theory itself undergoes a transformation as different sensibilities are brought to bear on its productions. The potential reinterpretations that emerge from these developments have particularly interesting consequences for the subject that appears to have aroused Freud's most reductive and inflexible tendencies: the nature of religion. The nexus of issues with which I am primarily concerned derives from the psychological problem of illusion, the category under which religion is classified in Freud's later work. The psychological analyses of illusion seek to reveal the fundamental determinants of religious belief and practice. In this far-ranging endeavor, it is possible that Freud's texts have opened levels of insight that transcend the more restricted intentionality he proclaims. I will attempt to illustrate that a careful reading, one that traces lines of