Abstract

This study aims to examine the impact of Shari’ah governance mechanism on the performance of Islamic banks (IBs) during the financial crisis of 2008. Data were collected from 66 IBs over 18 countries covering the period of 2007–2015 and analyzed using the System-GMM estimator. The findings indicate that an increase in SSB effectiveness increases IBs’ performance even during the crisis periods. A possible justification for this positive effect is related to the SG structure of IBs that allows them to undertake higher risks to achieve a high efficiency level. For this, the IBs, policymakers and practitioners should consider these findings when aiming to improve SG practices in the Islamic banking industry, which in turn may help in protecting IBs during crisis and non-crisis periods. More specifically, they should give due importance to SSB (size, cross-membership, educational qualification, reputation and expertise) in enhancing the performance of IBs during the crisis and non-crisis periods. This study provides additional evidence on how IBs can sustain their performance during either crisis or non-crisis periods through adopting appropriate SG structure. However, the study only focuses on a small sample of 66 IBs due to lack of the data.

Highlights

  • In the current practice, Islamic banks (IBs) are subject to two internal mechanisms of CG: The Board of Directors (BoD) and the Shari’ah supervisory boards (SSBs)

  • This result is in support of literature such as Nomran and Haron [27] who found a positive impact for the SSB score on the performance of Southeast Asia IBs

  • The importance of CG implementations has increased in the business environment especially after the financial crises: The Asian financial crisis of 1997 and the global financial crisis of 2008

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Summary

Introduction

Islamic banks (IBs) are subject to two internal mechanisms of CG: The Board of Directors (BoD) and the Shari’ah supervisory boards (SSBs). Banking and Finance bank failure as most of the customers prefer the IBs for religious reasons [6] These risks include higher costs, financial losses, liquidity problems, bank runs, bank failure, industry smearing and financial instability [6, 7]. Providing an efficient Shari’ah supervision is crucial to the IBs for failing to do so may give negative impact on the Islamic finance industry as a whole; the SSB has high responsibility and accountability in its role with regard to Shari’ah supervision.

Internal corporate governance mechanisms and financial crisis of 2008
Hypotheses development
Shari’ah supervision and bank performance
Sample
Measures of variables
Estimation method and model
Descriptive statistics
Correlation
Diagnostic test
Hypotheses test
Findings
Conclusion
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