Relativity, Causality and the ‘Substratum’

Abstract

called the special theory of relativity, no doubt one of the boldest and most interesting theories ever designed.' Generations of physicists, mathematicians and philosophers were inspired by it. Bitter battles were fought over its principles and deductions which clashed with many an honourable idea backed up by honourable philosophical and scientific traditions. Yet all the knocks and bites from left and right seem to have left Einstein's theory unshaken. Today the battle-grounds of yesterday look rather deserted. The critic is likely to be silenced in the face of the theory's spectacular success. In the following I shall try to throw some new light on one or two old problems which Einstein's theory gives rise to. Section z is concerned with the obstacles we are faced with when we try to combine Einstein's special theory of relativity with a causal account of relativistic phenomena. The argument does not show, of course, that Einstein's theory is false, but it points to a possible incompleteness and to certain limitations inherent in the special theory of relativity. In section 3 a substratum theory of relativity is outlined which seems to be as simple and coherent as Einstein's special theory of relativity; the Lorentz transformations are deduced from two basic principles without making use of the principle of relativity. Finally, in section 4, the two theories are compared and some general conclusions are drawn. But let us first have a short look at the ideas underlying Einstein's theory. To begin with, the special theory of relativity is a transformation theory. This is its most fundamental aspect. Suppose we know the space and time co-ordinates of an event particle e (event with negligible spatiotemporal extension) in an inertial frame of reference F; then the theory