Abstract

We analyze data about cigarette tax compliance from the first US-based national scale littered cigarette packs collection. We code each pack based on whether an appropriate tax had been paid at the location where it was found. Noncompliance across our 132 sample communities ranges from 0 percent to 100 percent with an appropriately weighted mean of 21 percent. We provide evidence that noncompliance is due to both cross-border shopping and cigarette trafficking. Ordinary least squares and binomial logit regressions demonstrate that the financial incentive for noncompliance is the most important explanatory variable and has a statistically and quantitatively significant impact on noncompliance. We find mixed evidence about the extent to which tax avoidance varies with distance to lower-tax borders. Our simulations show that, even after accounting for increased noncompliance, virtually all areas in our study would experience increases in tax revenue if they increased cigarette tax rates.

Highlights

  • Panel 1: full sample Panel 2: “Near the border” sample Figure 2: Panel 1 – Population shares by incentive for tax noncompliance” (IFNC) at the block level

  • Empirical estimates of cigarette demand functions have been important tools in the discussion of tobacco control policies but have been plagued by technical problems associated with unobserved consumption of low or no tax cigarettes

  • Our statistical analyses provide strong evidence that tax noncompliance increases with tax differentials and proximity to low tax cigarettes

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Summary

NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES

RELATIVE TAX RATES, PROXIMITY AND CIGARETTE TAX NONCOMPLIANCE: EVIDENCE FROM A NATIONAL SAMPLE OF LITTERED CIGARETTE PACKS Shu Wang David Merriman Frank J. NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138 August 2016. Relative Tax Rates, Proximity and Cigarette Tax Noncompliance: Evidence from a National Sample of Littered Cigarette Packs Shu Wang, David Merriman, and Frank J. Chaloupka NBER Working Paper No 22577 August 2016 JEL No H26,I12

List of Tables
Define the tax noncompliance rate as S
Max j
Popi Popc
CONCLUSION
Rank of community
Rocky Mountain
Robust standard errors in parentheses
Distance to border
Findings
Level of IFNC Share of

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