Relative Identity Relations: A Reply to Dr. Noonan

Abstract

(where 'a' and 'b' are singular terms and 'F' and 'G' are substantival or sortal terms) are satisfiable even when (i) the first conjunct is an identity statement and the second the negation of an identity statement, and (ii) a and b are both G's1 has been widely criticized, despite the wide range of examples which can be used to support it. Any effective criticism of (R) has to disarm these examples, and typically attempts to do this take one of two forms: either it is argued that statements of the form (i) do not involve identity statements in both conjuncts, or that the singular terms 'a' and 'b' are used ambiguously so as to refer to different objects in the first conjunct from those they refer to in the second. I have argued elsewhere2 that many of these arguments are questionbegging in fairly obvious ways. More recently, however, Harold Noonan has presented a more subtle argument which purports to show that in a large number of examples one or other conjunct is either false or does not involve an identity relation because the relation which is involved fails reflexivity.3 In what follows I shall argue that Noonan's argument, if valid, would refute, not all, but a substantial number of examples used to support (R); and, moreover, would entail the rejection of any concept (relative, or absolute) of identity through time. However, I shall claim also that his argument is not valid, because that part of it which purports to show that certain alleged relative identity statements fail reflexivity is invalid. Noonan sometimes directs his attack to the first conjunct of the example and sometimes to the second, his claim in each case is the same though his argument is different. Consider, first, an example, taken from John Perry,4 in which Noonan attacks the second conjunct: Suppose Smith buys a statue of Washington from Jones, but Jones delivers a statue of Harding made from the same clay. It then seems that the following example of (R) is true: 'This is the same piece of clay as the one you bought last week, but this is a different statue from the one you bought last week.' Perry attempts to disarm this example by arguing that the word 'this' in the first conjunct has a different reference from that which