Relative gains and the Common Agricultural Policy: the French government’s decision to reject the Blair House Agreement and block the completion of the Uruguay Round in 1993

Abstract

CESAA 19th ANNUAL EUROPE ESSAY COMPETITION 2011 - Undergraduate winner: Dan Norrie (Monash University)The French government’s rejection of the Blair House Agreement in 1993 enabled France to resist agricultural reform and achieve relative gains over other European Union States. The existence of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) allows France to extract the economic surplus of European Union (EU) members through taxes and subsidies, which artificially improve the competitiveness of French agriculture. France took advantage of the EU principle of consensus by adopting a strategy of non-compliance to agricultural negotiations, positioning it to directly influence EU Commission policy. This allowed France to benefit from EU bargaining power in the Uruguay Round, and ensure greater concessions from States driving agricultural reform. The reinstatement of veto power in the EU Community has made future agricultural reform more difficult, allowing France to continue to realise welfare gains at the expense of other EU members. The paper adopts a literature review to analyse French national interest and the costs and benefits of foreign policy strategies.