Relations, Inherence and Subsistence: or, Was Ockham a Nestorian in Christology?

Abstract

In his article Nominalism, Peter Geach foregoes a rehearsal of his many philosophical objections to Ockham's metaphysics as reflected in his philosophy of logic, in order to press what is for Christians an even more serious charge: viz., that Ockham's ontology leads to heresy regarding the central tenets of revealed theology ([2]: 143-2). In particular, his contention that there are no relative things (res) really distinct from absolute things blocks any intelligible formulation of the doctrine of the Trinity ([2]: 144-6) and combines with his theory of universals to yield the Nestorian heresy in Christology ([2]: 146-8, 150). A reader of the vast secondary literature hostile to Ockham has the sense that Geach is articulating a very widespread belief. Space being my limitation, I shall focus in what follows on the doctrine of the Incarnation and attempt to determine whether or not Ockham is guilty as charged. The discussion will reveal how Ockham allowed theology to modify his Aristotelian ontology in some predictable and some surprising ways.