Relational values of nature: Outgrowing anthropocentrism by enriching human-nature relationships?

Abstract

Increasingly, science-policy-oriented publications discuss the potential of ‘relational values of nature’ to bolster future conservation related decision-making. This paper unravels two meanings of relational values and elaborates on how these may add to the toolkit of conservation. Firstly, it is explained how relational values are a third axiological category and compare to instrumental and intrinsic values assigned to nature. Secondly, it is clarified how relational values appear part of a shift that seeks to improve conservation decision-making processes by mapping and recognising the multiple ways of valuing nature people have developed over time. This would allow to more comprehensively capture the context-specific perspectives on human-nature relations. It is argued that these two meanings of relational values underscore the need not to conflate the questions of how to make valuation methods more socially inclusive with prescriptive questions of why we should protect nature. To illustrate this, this paper focuses on New Zealand conservation legislation that demonstrates how relational values, rooted in place-based indigenous knowledge and traditions, are coded into rights of nature law. Partially based on this it is argued that while social inclusiveness in conservation is important, this may still allow for anthropocentrically inspired thinking. Ultimately, it is concluded that the potential of relational values can be more fully realised by using them to offer prescriptive guidance to conservation decision-making and practice. However, to facilitate this, their embeddedness in a meaningful relationship with, and care and respect towards, nature needs to be emphasized and mainstreamed.