Abstract
This chapter argues that the relational contract literature cannot offer a definition of relational contracts, to which special rules are to apply. It advances the theory that most contracts are in fact relational, and that the weakness of both classical law and modern relational theory derives from their shared implicit assumption that most contracts are discrete. Because most contracts are relational, a special body of law for relational contracts cannot be created. Instead, the general principles of contract law should be sufficiently expansive to deal appropriately with both relational and discrete contracts.
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