Related Party Transactions

Abstract

We describe related party (RP) transactions and investigate financial incentive and monitoring determinants for firms engaged in RP transactions. Our sample consists of 1,261 firms included in the S&P 1500. RP transactions are common in our sample, but vary substantially as to transaction type and disclosure. The most common RP transactions are loans, which are now largely prohibited by Section 402 of Sarbanes Oxley. Method of disclosure - financial statement footnote or proxy - appears largely driven by dollar-based materiality concerns. We also analyze two broad classes of determinants of RP transactions - financial incentives and monitoring. We find weaker corporate governance is associated with RP transactions, an inverse relationship between CEO and director's cash compensation and RP transactions, and a positive association between CEO stock options and RP transactions. However, director and officer ownership are not associated with RP transactions. Overall our results suggest associations between director and officer compensation, corporate governance and related party transactions.