Rejecting the order of public reason

Abstract

Gerald Gaus�s latest book achieves a remarkable, definitive development of the public reason project whose roots can be traced back to Locke and Kant and which had already attained its full expression in the later writing of John Rawls�or so we had thought! In fact Gaus takes a long step beyond Rawls. Gaus (2011). Page numbers enclosed in parentheses of the text refer to this book. For John Rawls on public reason, see especially his A Theory of Justice (1999); also Rawls (1996). In my view we should have a raised eyebrows response to the public reason project, but this does not gainsay Gaus�s achievement in rigorously working out its implications. The book develops an account of the justified imposition of moral constraints and, following that, of justified political arrangements. These comments focus on the former. Summary Like any genuinely original work, this one admits of quick summary. In everyday life, people make moral demands on each other, and claim a special authority in making