Abstract
In social dilemma games, human participants often show conditional cooperation (CC) behavior or its variant called moody conditional cooperation (MCC), with which they basically tend to cooperate when many other peers have previously cooperated. Recent computational studies showed that CC and MCC behavioral patterns could be explained by reinforcement learning. In the present study, we use a repeated multiplayer prisoner’s dilemma game and the repeated public goods game played by human participants to examine whether MCC is observed across different types of game and the possibility that reinforcement learning explains observed behavior. We observed MCC behavior in both games, but the MCC that we observed was different from that observed in the past experiments. In the present study, whether or not a focal participant cooperated previously affected the overall level of cooperation, instead of changing the tendency of cooperation in response to cooperation of other participants in the previous time step. We found that, across different conditions, reinforcement learning models were approximately as accurate as a MCC model in describing the experimental results. Consistent with the previous computational studies, the present results suggest that reinforcement learning may be a major proximate mechanism governing MCC behavior.
Highlights
In our recent computational study, we showed that a reinforcement learning model could explain conditional cooperation (CC) and moody conditional cooperation (MCC) patterns without explicitly assuming a CC or MCC behavioral rule[38]
We analyzed behavioral patterns of human participants engaged in two social dilemma games, i.e., the multiplayer prisoner’s dilemma game (PDG) and the public goods game (PGG)
There is a major difference between the present MCC patterns and those observed in the previous experiments
Summary
In our recent computational study, we showed that a reinforcement learning model could explain CC and MCC patterns without explicitly assuming a CC or MCC behavioral rule[38]. The fraction of cooperators averaged over all participants in the PDG and the mean fraction of contribution in the PGG are plotted against the round in Fig. 1a,b, respectively. The results for the fixed and mixed treatments, aggregated over the participants and rounds, are shown in Fig. 2a,b, respectively.
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Disclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.