Reimagining direct democracy as an intersection of different forms of representation

Matija Miloš

doi:10.5937/pravzap0-26102

Abstract

As an exceptional device in the life of contemporary constitutional democracies, direct democracy is normally considered to be separate from representation. In this paper, I explore this well-established divide, asking how it interacts with our understanding of the central subject of direct democracy, the people. I show how theorizing that takes its cue from the dichotomy between "absence" and "presence", ascribed to the separation of representation and forms of direct democracy, is tied with identifying the active electorate and the people. On the other hand, this approach is inept for comprehending the ways representations of the people are produced and instrumentalized in the wake of direct democracy. In this paper, I suggest that this phenomenon may be approached by examining how direct democracy is entangled with representing "the people" through arguments, processes and constructs.

Highlights

Direct democracy has enjoyed a renewed attention in the quarters of constitutional theory, most notably with respect to constitutional amendments.[1]
As I have already noted, political theorists have extensively discussed what “representation” means in the abstract and at least two different meanings of the concept were identified in constitutional theory, representation as a shorthand for representative democracy and as the basic precondition for the existence and exercise of the state’s powers.[54]
Ordering the interaction between the latter and the representative element in this sense may reassert the divide between the two. The bridging of this divide may be achieved by insisting on arguments from representation, as was the case in a series of Croatian citizens’ initiatives in which the Constitutional Court prevented a referendum from taking place because it found that the Croatian parliament had adopted the suggestion contained in the initiative.[72]

Summary

Introduction

Direct democracy has enjoyed a renewed attention in the quarters of constitutional theory, most notably with respect to constitutional amendments.[1]. As I have already noted, political theorists have extensively discussed what “representation” means in the abstract and at least two different meanings of the concept were identified in constitutional theory, representation as a shorthand for representative democracy and as the basic precondition for the existence and exercise of the state’s powers.[54] legal scholars have noted that representation is an extraordinarily pliable notion that may be deployed as a rhetorical device and a justification for a change in the nature of the regime.[55] Remember, for instance, that Sieyes used representation to argue that the Constituent Assembly is the bearer of pouvoir constituant and that this power generally cannot be deployed without representation.[56] Representation is both a broad concept and a concept that can be used to construct political realities. I will take each of these in turn

REPRESENTATION AS AN ARGUMENT

REPRESENTATION AS A PROCESS

REPRESENTATION AS A CONSTRUCT

Conclusion