Reid and Kames

Abstract

Abstract This chapter examines how Reid sets out a view of active causal agency in opposition to Hume’s causal scepticism. After explaining the difference between the principles of causality and the idea of causation itself, it is explained how Reid thinks that we possess an idea of active power revealed to us only through our own activity as free and personal agents. The chapter then looks at Reid’s argument that, since causation is only exercised by spirits but the majority of natural phenomena are clearly not brought about by any finite spirit known to us, such events must be thought of as being brought about by God. The implications of this position for science are examined through a consideration of Reid’s distinction between scientific causes and true causes. After considering Reid’s positions on free will and on the self, the chapter concludes with a brief discussion of Lord Kames, demonstrating the way in which his understanding stands mid-way between those of Hume and Reid.