Abstract

Abstract We document novel evidence on the spillover effect of a corporate control regulation on local mortgage markets. We find that banks directly targeted by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) to rectify their internal control weaknesses reduce mortgage originations following the regulation’s enactment. This causes mortgage credit to be reallocated toward other banks in the same local markets: while competing public banks expand lending to safer borrowers, private banks increase lending toward risky applicants. Consequently, loans originated by private banks in spillover counties report higher default rates. (JEL E51, G21, G38) Received February 27, 2021; editorial decision August 21, 2022 by Editor Camelia Kuhnen. Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online.

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