Abstract
In England and Wales wheel-clamping has been considered to be increasingly effective in relation to evasion of vehicle excise duty but its use and popularity have declined in relation to illegal parking. To explain and evaluate this contrasting experience, I adopt an analytical framework based on the economic theory of deterrence. I indicate how in some circumstances conventional financial penalties provide inadequate deterrence and drawing particularly on insights generated by behavioural law and economics how sanctions involving inconvenience and hassle may provide a solution. Applying this analysis, I explain how wheel-clamping may be justified for excise duty evasion, but not for illegal parking. Added support for this conclusion is provided by private interest theory.
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