Regulatory Policymaking at the Federal Trade Commission: The Extent of Congressional Control

Abstract

In a recent issue of this Journal, Weingast and Moran (1983) argue that Congress controls agency decisions, and they use the experience of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) in the 1970s as an example. Although Congress can, and often does, exert considerable influence over agencies such as the FTC, Weingast and Moran's approach is flawed. The authors use changes in the preferences of members of Congress, as reflected in the ratings generated by the Americans for Democratic Action (ADA), to predict changes in agency behavior. As they contend, unless we can show that these shifts in preferences [i.e., changes in ADA ratings for members of Congress] result in large changes in caseload distribution [for textile, Robinson-Patman, and credit cases], we will have trouble arguing that committee preferences play an important role in agency policymaking (p. 788). The facts reveal that they indeed have serious trouble with their argument. Table 1 lists the number of FTC cases in each fiscal year from 1977 to 1981, reflecting the period October 1, 1976-September 30, 1981.'