REGULATORY INCENTIVES FOR REDUCING LOSSES AND INCREASING NETWORK UTILIZATION WHEN PLUG-IN ELECTRIC VEHICLES ARE CONNECTED IN ARGENTINIAN DISTRIBUTION SYSTEMS

Abstract

We look for reducing losses, improving efficiency and increasing network utilization in low voltage utility networks when distributed plug-in EV are randomly connected. At first, we analyse a not managed charging strategies and several EV penetration factors to study utility network performance. We consider driving distances, EV time arriving, state of charge and residential demand statistical variables. Then, we analyse the technical level of losses and power quality for different scenarios. Results show letting the charging process in the user's hands without appropriate regulatory incentives produces poor power quality technical levels. We have also shown two possible regulatory incentive solutions. First one is demand management, postponing the mean time of starting the charging process to late night hours by means of differentiated smart tariffs. Our study case shows good results because Argentinian utility networks are few loaded at late night hours. Second shown solution is modifying traditional radial grid design to better allow EV insertion. It could be interesting in a context where grid design is under consideration, but needs a clear incentive to DSOs for such a planning. It could be done by a cost plus tariff or by an appropriately calculated price cap tariff.