Abstract
ABSTRACTThis study employed Stilger’s (1971) capture theory to investigate whether the Investment Dealers Association (IDA) of Canada experienced regulatory capture by weak enforcement. The study used data of the IDA’s enforcement practices to test the hypothesis that proportionately smaller fines are imposed for more serious offenders, ceteris paribus. Among the factors that influenced fines, one can find investigation costs and quasi-criminal offences as the main predictors making significant contributions. The result presented in the study can be use by legislators to further engage in dialogues on the importance of a federal securities regulatory agency in Canada.
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