Abstract
AbstractBureaucratic rulemaking is a key feature of American policymaking. However, rulemaking activities do not occur uniformly, but fluctuate throughout the year. We consider three mechanisms to explain these changes in rule volume, each of which produces unique expectations for rulemaking during periods of divided government and legislative recess. To test these expectations, we leverage an original dataset including all rules proposed by bureaucratic agencies in three U.S. states from 2004 to 2013 matched with data tracking periods of divided government and legislative recess. We find that state bureaucracies publish significantly more proposed rules during periods of divided government or a split legislature and are most productive in the months immediately following legislative recess. These results underscore the importance of bureaucratic policymaking and improve our understanding of the balance of power between branches of state governments.
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