Regulation, Supervisiin and Accounting Conservatism in Banks

Abstract

The main purpose of this article is to evaluate the effects of the three pillars of Basel II, i.e. bank regulation, supervision and market discipline, on the timeliness of loan loss provisioning by banks. In particular, we analyze explicitly how regulatory and supervisory regimes interact with the market discipline measures, such as listing status, ownership and market concentration. Using a sample of 14,651 bank-year observations covering 54 countries over the period 1997-2009, we provide empirical evidence suggesting that a) the stringency of the regulatory and supervisory regimes is positively associated with accounting conservatism; b) unlisted banks and commercial banks are more conservative than listed entities and savings banks, respectively; and c) banks operating in more concentrated markets exhibit a lower degree of timeliness in loan loss recognition. In addition, our results suggest that strong capital requirements mitigate the effect of market concentration and governance on accounting conservatism, whereas strict regulatory regimes tend to reinforce the effect of both variables on early loan loss recognition.