Regulation of Property Relations Based on the Preferences of Economic Agents as a Tool for Increasing Aggregate Total Welfare on the Example of the Russian Forestry Complex

Abstract

The balance of preferences of economic agents and formal institutions is the key to long-term growth of well-being. The article suggests a mechanism for increasing the compliance of institutional transformations with the revealed preferences (using the example of the Russian forest complex). A categorical apparatus based on the comparison of the functions of subjects of endogenous and exogenous distribution has been developed. It is shown that despite the comparative economic efficiency of the endogenous set (confirmed by the results of regression analysis), the real distribution is characterized by the presence of quasi-market preferences. In this context, the influence of path dependence (using the time preference operator) on rational expectations, and, accordingly, budget sets and production sets of agents, is formalized. The scheme of a limited set of available powers of the lessee of forest plots is presented. A model for regulating the distribution of property rights has been developed based on comparing the dynamics of cash flows with institutional changes. The model has been tested. The concept of institutional transformations of the Russian forest complex in the direction of strengthening endogenous-contractual relations, specification of private and state powers and optimization of forest management and forest accounting functions is proposed.