Regulation and Contraband Trade in the Bangladeshi Borderland: Whose Weapons?

Abstract

ABSTRACT The article presents an ethnographic evidence on the informal economic activities of the cattle traders on the border area of Bangladesh surrounding Indian state of West-Bengal. On the basis of fieldwork and in-depth interviews, the article shows how the powerful traders manage to accrue wealth for themselves with the collusion of state officials from the trading activity while the small traders and carriers manage to earn their share of benefit. The study also indicates the paradox of state behavior while regulating the trading activity: on the one hand the state demonstrates its inability to facilitate the trade across the border on the other hand the state is collecting tax from the traders. By drawing on the theoretical debates on informal economy, the analysis demonstrates that the strong presence of the state in regulating the trading activity puts the limit on the maneuvering space of the influential traders while harassment of the small traders by border security forces and increasing death toll of the carriers compromises the position of the weak in this trading site. Therefore, the study argues that the trading activity neither constitutes as a “weapon of the weak” nor as a “weapon of the strong”-rather it reflects an ambiguous character. Second, despite hostile border security environment and absence of any formal regulatory arrangements, the cross-border cattle trade remains efficient, highly organized and deeply rooted business in the border area of Bangladesh.