Regulating the Newfoundland Inshore Fishery: Traditional Values Versus State Control in the Regulation of a Common Property Resource

Abstract

This paper focuses upon how the values inherent in the theory of common property resource management relate to the regulatory of the inshore fïshery of Newfoundland. This theory, drawing upon Hobbesian assumptions, views collective irrationality as a product of individual rationality within open access fisheries, and has been incorporated into federal licensing policy. Based upon interviews with 144 inshore fishermen and 51 fishery officers, conducted during 1982-83 and 1985 respectively, the paper argues that this theory has been accepted by both fishery officers and inshore fishermen. However, even after licensing was introduced, fishermen still participated in local controls over access to the inshore fishery; collective irrationality is not necessarily associated with open-access fisheries. Given this, fishermen’s acceptance of licensing policy may be related to changes in the class structure of the inshore fishery since the late 1960s.