Abstract
How should we regulate genome editing in the face of persistent substantive disagreement about the moral status of this technology and its applications? In this paper, we aim to contribute to resolving this question. We first present two diametrically opposed possible approaches to the regulation of genome editing. A first approach, which we refer to as "elitist," is inspired by Joshua Greene's work in moral psychology. It aims to derive at an abstract theoretical level what preferences people would have if they were committed to implementing public policies regulating genome editing in a context of ethical pluralism. The second approach, which we refer to as the democratic approach, defended by Francoise Baylis and Sheila Jasanoff et al., emphasizes the importance of including the public's expressed attitudes in the regulation of genome editing. After pointing out a serious shortcoming with each of these approaches, we propose our own favored approach-the "enlightened democracy" approach-which attempts to combine the strengths of the elitist and democratic approaches while avoiding their weaknesses.
Highlights
How should we regulate genome editing in the face of persistent substantive disagreement about the moral status of this technology and its applications? In this paper, we aim to contribute to resolving this question
There are substantive ethical questions, such as questions regarding the moral status of the new biotechnology and the ethical dilemmas that may arise from its application
In the remainder of this section, we focus primarily on how the work of Greene in moral psychology could underpin an approach that seeks to determine what regulations on genome editing people would agree upon if they were governed by reason
Summary
We focus our criticism on an elitist approach modeled on Greene’s proposal, but our arguments would apply to other elitist approaches.[37]. As is often highlighted in the literature on trust and expertise, it would be difficult for science to make progress without this trust[41] and without legitimacy.[42] In addition, it has been argued that relying on a democratic process is good because involving rival points of view is more likely to lead to better policy outcomes, given that different ethical and practical problems are more likely to be considered and analyzed.[43] These reasons point to something similar: in liberal, democratic societies, public policies, and political decisions in general, cannot do without some form of support by the people who will be affected by those policies. As they often do, dissent is dismissed as evidence that publics just do not get the science. . . . The impulse to dismiss public views as ill-informed is itself ill-informed but is problematic because it deprives society of the freedom to decide what forms of progress are culturally and morally acceptable.”[48]
Sign-in/Register to view highlights & summary Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Free) 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a call
