Regulating Capital in Accumulation: Negotiating the Imperial 'Frontier'

Abstract

There are three major propositions that underpin this article. First that the poorest countries are still incorporated into the global economy in adverse terms, or in a way once described by the dependency and neo-marxist schools as 'dependent'. Second, that this is not because of neutral, market driven features of globalisation or comparative advantage, but by deliberate and political intervention by people and institutions of the richer countries, moderated by the behaviour of (African and other) political elites. I shall model this interaction institutionally and propose that this serves as a 'Keynesian global multiplier' for investors, but provides very limited gains to host countries. Third, that African states have developed their own means of creating markets and state-sponsored means of accumulation, primarily by processes of local content rules, indigenisation and empowerment. These are inevitably subject to contextual questions of legitimacy. The article concludes that the current conceptualisation of government as essentially outside the market prevents us from understanding these emerging institutional structures and economic multipliers; it also disables consideration of the types of redistributive policy that are so essential for socio-economic recovery.