Abstract
Chapter 3 starts out with some bad news for views that yield an infinite regress of ontological dependence. It is argued that such views leave us with an inherent explanatory gap: it is impossible to fully explain the nature of every dependent entity on the infinitely descending chain. Only Metaphysical Foundationalism can explain all dependent phenomena. However, it is further argued that this is no reductio of Metaphysical Infinitism, because we ought to pull apart the notions of ontological dependence and grounding from the notion of metaphysical explanation. An account of metaphysical explanation is defended whereby we can explain a phenomenon by saying what it is for that phenomenon to obtain in more tractable terms. This lets us say that grounding and ontological dependence are objective, context-independent phenomena, while acknowledging the pragmatic, interest-relative nature of explanation.
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
