Abstract

ABSTRACT This article addresses the shifting patterns of regionalism and alliance formation in the Middle East in the decade following the 2011 Arab uprisings. It seeks to explain why regional organizations, most notably the Arab League and the Gulf Cooperation Council, failed to advance any durable regional cooperation, in spite of an initial period of bold activism. Second, the article seeks to shed light on why government-driven, informal and instable regional alignments that also include non-Arab parties and non-state actors came to prevail instead. Our approach draws on Stephan Walt’s concept of the balance of threats; we posit however that this concept needs to integrate a liberal-constructivist perspective to assess both the nature of threats and the significance of domestic factors. While we consider the Arab uprisings a potential turning point, our explanation of the patterns of cooperation and conflict in the Middle East after the uprisings points to regime (in)security and shifting threat perceptions as key factors. They explain the side-lining of established regional organizations and the priority given to alternative and volatile forms of regional cooperation, that is, the prevalence of “liquid alliances.”

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