Regional Separatism in Russia: Ethnic Mobilisation or Power Grab?

Abstract

WHAT ROLE DID ETHNIC REVIVAL PLAY in the push for sovereignty among Russia's ethnic republics during the transition from a communist Soviet Union to a postcommunist Russian Federation? Many scholars and politicians believe that the sovereignty drive among former autonomous republics in Russia was orchestrated primarily to preserve the communist-era local elite's control over their regions and to increase their power vis-d-vis the central government.' To the extent that issues are said to figure in the parade of sovereignty, they concern economic independence, not ethno-cultural revival. In fact, ethnic self-determination is viewed almost as a front for 'what is really going on', rhetoric designed to make the local accretion of power conform to international norms.2 Roeder and Treisman have been the strongest proponents of this point of view. Roeder argues that 'while the concern with identity politics focuses on the attributes of ethnic groups and their grievances, ... the explanation for these phenomena lies ... in the pursuit of political survival by politicians'.3 Arguing from a rational choice perspective, Roeder believes that minority ethnic politicians in the Russian Federation were concerned almost exclusively with retaining political control over their regions. For this reason, they focused primarily on instrumental concerns such as increasing the wealth and fiscal autonomy of the region. The leaders' success was determined by their ability to provide selective material incentives to their followers in their republics. The provision of expressive incentives was necessary only in order 'to give regional leaders an advantage over competitors offering non-ethnic agendas'.4 Because ethnic and cultural benefits were public goods which could not be denied to the followers of political opponents, their actual provision did not benefit the regional leaders. In this situation, ethnic rhetoric was sufficient to convince members of the ethnic community that the regional leader was part of the group and predispose them toward supporting the leader. Material incentives would ensure that a sufficient number of these potential supporters would actually rally to the cause. Treisman believes that separatism in Russia was often simply a tool to increase regional wealth at the expense of the central government. He writes: 'Separatist threats may, at times, be bids to increase a region's financial dependence on the centre. Rather than expressions of primordial cultural aspirations, they may constitute weapons in a competitive struggle to extract a larger share of centrally bestowed benefits'.5 Solnick, in an article focused primarily on federal bargaining, notes that the leaders of the ethnic republics attempted to justify their privileged status in the