Abstract
The article explores the role of single-mandate deputies in lobbying regional interests. Having analyzed the influence of deputies elected through the majority system in single-member constituencies on decision-making in the budget sphere, A.Starodubtsev comes to a conclusion that the corresponding part of the deputy corps has indeed been fulfilling the functions of regional lobbyists, and the loss of this representation channel by subjects of the RF will inevitably affect the whole system of their relations with the federal center. According to the author’s assessment, one of the consequences of this will very probably be that an open and observable procedure of regional lobbying within Duma committees will be replaced by an unofficial “haggle” between representatives of federal and regional elites.
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Free) 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a call
