Regime Insiders and Revolution

Abstract

We study a coordination problem where two distinct groups of individuals are in competition with each other. One group (regime opponents) prefers a change in regime, and can participate in an attack which if sufficiently large, causes regime change. The other group (regime adherents) prefers the status quo and can support the regime, making it more resistant to attack. We derive and analyze the endogenously determined strength of the regime. We also show that large disparities in group size can lead to equilibrium multiplicity. By isolating the coordinating effect of public information that results from the ``two-sidedness'' of the coordination problem, we detail how coordination between regime adherents intensifies the already disproportionate effect of public information. Specifically, we show that public information affects the actions of individuals in each group identically, regardless of disparities in the quality of private information available to members of each group, implying that commonly observed sources of information will coordinate both regime adherents and regime opponents in exactly the same way. Last, we formalize and analyze coordination failure in the context of opposed interests.