Regime elites and civil society: Assessing the channels of pro-government mobilization in autocracies

Abstract

ABSTRACT This article takes a systematic approach to unpack how pro-government mass action emerges in autocracies. Both the channels and triggers of pro-regime mass action are considered using a large-n dataset of mass mobilization in autocracies between 2003 and 2017. We test quantitively how mass mobilization can occur in autocracies – through party elites and regime-affiliated organizations – and find stronger evidence for the role of elites in enabling pro-government mass action through their use of clientelistic linkages with constituents. However, contrary to expectation, in the aftermath of a particular trigger (i.e., anti-government protests) the likelihood of pro-government mobilization is highest when regime-affiliated organizations are weak or nonexistent. The magnitude of this effect is higher for violent anti-government opposition, as compared to nonviolent dissent, suggesting that violent anti-government opposition tactics tend to generate pro-government mobilization as a form of backlash against the violence and are more polarizing in autocratic civil societies.