Abstract
Studies of elections held by autocrats often assume that institutions are strengthened in order to increase the leverage of the dictator. Yet, it can also be the case that institutions are purposely weakened when autocrats allow for elections. This is what happened in the 2019 Thai elections. These elections were notable not for advancing “national reform” or democratisation, but for the deinstitutionalisation of the party system. Through three mechanisms – constitutional engineering, electoral manipulation, and legal rulings – Thailand's royalist elites were able to deinstitutionalise the opposition and undermine a fair, democratic process. This paper outlines these mechanisms of deinstitutionalisation that distorted the outcome of the 2019 elections.
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