Abstract

Used informally, the Reductio ad Absurdum (RAA) consists in reasoning appealing to the logically implied, absurd consequences of a hypothetical proposition, in order to refute it. This kind of reasoning resembles the Argument from Consequences, which appeals to causally induced consequences. These types of argument are sometimes confused, since it is not worked out how these different kinds of consequences should be distinguished. In this article it is argued that the logical consequences in RAA-argumentation can take different appearances and that it therefore must be concluded that RAA cannot be characterised by a specific content, but must instead be characterised as an argument form. Furthermore, clues are provided to distinguish RAA reasoning from the Argument from Consequences.

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