Refutation of the Prescription of Death Penalty for Apostasy in Musa Bigiev’s book <i>Qawaʼid fiqhiyyah</i>

Abstract

The article examines the example of ijtihad by Musa Jarullah Bigiev (1875–1949), which consists of a critical analysis and refutation of the Shari‘a provision prescribing the death penalty for apostates who renounced Islam. The material is based on Bigiev’s comments to one of the rules of fiqh, collected and presented by him on the pages of the work “Qawa‘id fiqhiyyah” (Kazan, 1910). Bigiev calls one of Shari‘a goals “protection of life,” i. e. the protection of the rights of both humanity as a species and each individual. At the same time, he considers the “right to freedom” to be an innate and inalienable human right. As an integral part of this right, Bigiev considers the “right to freedom of religion” as a Shari‘a principle, which is designed to prevent reprisals against those who change their faith and, in light of this conclusion, raises the question of whether the practice of the death penalty for apostasy is consistent with Islam. In conclusion, the idea of the existence of two types of Muslim fundamentalism, essentially different from each other, is voiced.