Reforming the Tsar's Army: Military Innovation in Imperial Russia from Peter the Great to the Revolution by David Schimmelpenninck s> van der Oye Bruce W. Menning (review)

Abstract

344 SEER, 83, 2, 2005 even mention that '[t]he history of Russian photography began in Odessa' (P. II 2).Nonetheless, thiswork'svisualvirtuosity,which will make it usefulto historiansand teachersof late imperialRussian historyalike,is sadlylet down by the accompanying texts' disparatenatureand failureto provide answersto many basic questions. Merton College, Oxford TIMOTHY S. J. PHILLIPS Schimmelpenninck van der Oye, David and Menning, Bruce W. (eds). Reforming theTsar'sArmy: MilitagyInnovation inImperial Russia fromPeterthe Great totheRevolution. Woodrow Wilson Center Series. Woodrow Wilson Center Press and Cambridge University Press, Washington D.C. and Cambridge, 2004. xi + 36I pp. Illustrations. Notes. Index. ?45.00: $65.00. RUSSIANmilitary history, for long a neglected field, has boomed of late, notablyin the United States.This volume containsfifteenessaysby specialists, allbutthreeofthemNorthAmerican,who focuson problemsof administrative reform.Three other contributorsseek to situatethis somewhat dry, recondite topic in a generalhistoricalcontext. Severalof these scholarsalsohave articles in 7The Militay Histogy of Tsarist Russia,ed. F. W. Kagan and R. Higham (New York and London, 2002), to which this forms a worthy pendant. Oddly, though, there are no maps. It is 'grosslyexaggerated', saysGudrunPersson(p. 151), to see the imperial Russian armyas a 'bastionof conservatism';neverthelessmuch herebearsout the conventional view. Time and again reform efforts were frustrated by courtiers or bureaucratswho clung to unrealistic, outdated notions. We are not offered an adequate picture of this opposition in these pages, although impersonal obstacles to reform, such as the empire's vast size and ethnic diversity,do receive attention. Paul Bushkovitchreminds us that Peter I had to take many senior commanders from the old boyar aristocracy, likely to resenthisinnovations,ratherthanfromsocialupstartsorforeignprofessionals. Although he refrainsfrom saying so, this does not seem to have had adverse effectsin the field. Marching smartlyforwardto the end of the century, Bruce W. Menning shows how GrigoriiPotemkin,as virtualtsarof southernRussia, skilfully adapted strategy to frontier conditions and took a common-sense approach to his troops' welfare. Unhappily most of these advances did not outlive him. Alexander I's martial shortcomings emerge clearly. The elaborate statute of January I812 on administration of the Active Army, studied here by Frederick W. Kagan, seems to have had little practical import in the subsequent campaign; indeed, Menning attributesRussia'svictory largely to good fortune [and] improvisation'(p. 284) aided, of course,by Napoleonas follies. Supplies were woefully inadequate, but just how far the newly establishedMain Staffwas to blame remains unclear. Nicholas I's obsession with militaryaffairsyielded mountainsofpaper, but againwith limitedresults. Dmitrii I. Oleinikov (Moscow) rescues the Caucasian wars from undeserved oblivion, pointing out that Chechen tribesmen had (some!) better weapons REVIEWS 345 than the Russians (p. 2IO),which obliged the latter to make improvements. But he does not ask himself whether well-attested Russian atrocities against civilians stimulated resistance: here M. Gammer's study of I994, not cited, would have added balance. The reforms associated with Alexander II's long-serving War minister, Dmitrii A. Miliutin, naturallywin pride of place. Robert F. Baumann deals expertlywith the way the I874 universalmilitaryservicelawwas implemented in practice. Forall its inequitiesthe measurewas 'fundamentallysound [. . .] a catalyst for civic improvement'; notably, it promoted social mobility and by 191 I 49 per cent of officers were non-nobles (pp. 32, 23). In a pioneering study Mark von Hagen examines conscription's ethnic impact. Certain minoritieswere exempted and othersdiscriminatedagainst,but by 19I7 these 'privileges'had been radically curtailed and there were several non-Russian units. The role of railways in mobilizing such masses of men was crucial (Jacob W. Kipp, pp. 82-103). Though much was achieved, it was never enough, and already the war with Turkey (I877-78) exposed Russia's weaknessin thisrespect.Nor was the high command up to the mark,since the reformers,who rightly pushed for a bold offensive strategy,were worsted by the grand-ducallobby. David A. Rich shows that the conservativessuffereda major (hitherto disregarded)setback in i887, when the Main Staff devised 'Russia's first truly viable war plan' based on specialized knowledge rather than 'the prerogatives [. . .] of the dynastic regime' (p. I84). Once again, however, the reformers' success was temporary, as the Russo-Japanesewar would amply demonstrate. After I905, rescued from ignominious defeat by the diplomats, Russia's militaryleadersvigorouslydebated organizationalchanges to boost efficiency, but the result was an uneasy compromise. Menning commends the...