Abstract

BackgroundTo promote an effective mental health system, the World Health Organization recommends the involvement of primary care in prevention and treatment of mild diseases and community-based care for serious mental illnesses. Despite a prevalence of lifetime mental health disorders above 30%, Portugal is failing to achieve such recommendations. It was argued that this failure is partly due to inadequate financing mechanisms of mental health care providers. This study proposes an innovative payment model for mental health providers oriented toward incentivising best practices.MethodsWe performed a comprehensive review of healthcare providers’ payment schemes and their related incentives, and a narrative review of best practices in mental health prevention and care. We designed an alternative payment model, on the basis of the literature, and then we presented it individually, through face-to-face interviews, to a panel of 22 experts with different backgrounds and experience, and from southern and northern Portuguese regions, asking them to comment on the model and provide suggestions. Then, after a first round of interviews, we revised our model, which we presented to experts again for their approval, and provide new suggestions and comments, if deemed necessary. This approach is close to what is generally known as the Delphi technique, although it was not applied in a rigid way.ResultsWe designed a four-dimension model that focused on (i) the prevention of mental disorders early in life; (ii) the detection of mental disorders in childhood and adolescence; (iii) the implementation of a collaborative stepped care model for depression; and (iv) the integrated community-based care for patients with serious mental illnesses. First, we recommend a bundled payment to primary care practices for the follow-up of children with special needs or at risk under 2 years of age. Second, we propose a pay-for-performance scheme for all primary care practices, based on the number of users under 18 years old who are provided with check-up consultations. Third, we propose a pay-for-performance scheme for all primary care practices, based on the implementation of collaborative stepped care for depression. Finally, we propose a value-based risk-adjusted bundled payment for patients with serious mental illness.ConclusionsThe implementation of evidence-based best practices in mental health needs to be supported by adequate payment mechanisms. Our study shows that mental health experts, including decision makers, agree with using economic tools to support best practices, which were also consensual.

Highlights

  • To promote an effective mental health system, the World Health Organization recommends the involvement of primary care in prevention and treatment of mild diseases and community-based care for serious mental illnesses

  • McLaughlin [19] estimate that parental mental health (MH) disorders, parental criminality, family violence, and physical or sexual abuse, are all related to a higher likelihood of MH disorders during childhood, adolescence, and adulthood

  • Given that vigilance consultations are specific services that need to be encouraged, and that MH evaluation is more time consuming, we suggest the payment of an additional fee to general practitioner (GP) for each follow-up consultation including MH evaluation, using the diagnosis evaluation grid

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Summary

Introduction

To promote an effective mental health system, the World Health Organization recommends the involvement of primary care in prevention and treatment of mild diseases and community-based care for serious mental illnesses. In a previous contribution [5], that this failure was partly due to the inadequate payment mechanisms of Portuguese MH care providers, which did not encourage best practices. Among these mechanisms we highlighted the volume-based hospital financing system, which does not encourage the continuity of care or communitybased interventions; and the capitation-based model for PHC, which favors long lists and short consultations, completed by a pay-for-performance (P4P) scheme that does not include a single MH indicator

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