Abstract

The EU currently experiences a reform dilemma which is common to many international organizations composed of a large number of veto players who must adopt a change of the status quo. After the accession of ten countries in May 2004, the 25 governmental veto players adopted a modest reform text that proposes as many changes as it retains provisions of the Nice treaty. This ambivalent outcome raised much criticism and has been rejected by the French and Dutch voters who had to ratify the reform. This raises questions on the reasons for change and stability in organizations which attempt to reform their obsolete provisions under the constraint of many (types of) veto players. This study examines under which conditions the positions of the different types of veto players—governments, parliamentary ratification pivots, median voters and the supranational actors—are important to explain the outcome of the draft treaty. Our results suggest that the probability for reform is only determined by governmental gains when we control for parliamentary ratification pivots and median voters from status quo-prone member states. We also find that governments favoring the status quo retain their veto in case either parliaments or voters favor reform. This responsiveness is supported by the fact that median voters also matter when member states did not announce a referendum.

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