Reforming public pensions in democratizing Korea and Taiwan: actors, institutions and policy outcomes

Abstract

ABSTRACTDespite the fact that Korea and Taiwan are often cited together to have shared a common path, their post-democratization developmental trajectory shows a diverging pattern. Taking the case of public pension reform, we argue that the changing nature of political competition and its impact on pension reforms are key, particularly in relation to the ways in which the existing structure of old-age protection influences the configuration of pension politics. The arrival of democratic governance itself does not tell us much about the possible reform agendas and trajectories. Nor does it provide us with a clear understanding of the distributional implications of public policies as institutions. Instead we see growing prominence of the policy dynamics around the question of how the early decisions and choices shape the emerging interest formation. Democratic politics has accelerated policy’s influence on politics, reinforcing the conditioning effect of the legacies the earlier policymaking episodes have created.