Reforming EU merger control to capture ‘killer acquisitions’ – the case for caution

Abstract

This article examines whether EU merger control rules should be recalibrated to address concerns said to arise from acquisitions of innovative start-ups by established digital platforms – commonly referred to as ‘killer’ or ‘nascent’ acquisitions. It assesses various proposals designed to remedy two failings: a perceived failure to review anti-competitive transactions due to inadequate jurisdictional thresholds and a perceived failure to detect competition problems during the merger review process. It argues that, given the large number of transactions already subject to merger control, any expansion of existing rules should occur only where there is clear evidence of a significant enforcement gap. In the view of the authors, there is no persuasive evidence that a material number of anti-competitive digital acquisitions are escaping antitrust scrutiny, that the analytical framework applied by the European Commission should be significantly changed, or that the methodological tools employed to review concentrations are unfit for purpose. The authors therefore disfavour wide-ranging changes to the EU's rules and instead propose a series of incremental improvements to ensure that EU merger enforcement is tailored to the digital age.