Reform Styles of Political and Administrative Elites in Majoritarian and Consensus Democracies: Public Management Reforms in New Zealand and the Netherlands

Abstract

One of the most important claims advanced by comparative public management reform studies is that these reforms have been more successfully implemented in majoritarian than in consensus democracies. The claim is built on the premise that the institutional structure of a majoritarian democracy enables a parliamentary majority to implement policies unilaterally and in a desired way whereas the institutional structure of a consensus democracy forces parliamentary majorities to negotiate compromises. This claim, we argue, lacks sufficient empirical backing, is biased by studies focusing on the initiation of reforms, and needs serious rethinking in the light of recent empirical studies that downplay the salience of institutions as an explanatory factor for variations in policy reform. With The Netherlands and New Zealand as cases, this article first shows that far‐reaching reforms can be implemented in consensus systems too; secondly, it develops a model that centres on the interplay between institutions and politicians’ reform styles and applies this to these countries.