Abstract
AbstractInformal economy involving unrecorded, unregistered, extra‐legal activities employs majority of the work force in the developing world. Such extra‐legal existence of informal production is facilitated through extortion by agents of political forces in power. Also, extortion activities themselves constitute an informal segment. Full‐scale general equilibrium consequences of such institutions are rarely discussed in the literature. We develop a well‐specified general equilibrium model to explore the possible consequences of reform. Economic reform may have an expansionary effect on the number of extortionists. Depending on capital mobility and factor intensity assumptions informal output and informal wage may increase.
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
