Reform in the Russian Army, 1856–1861

Abstract

Historians of imperial Russia have agreed unanimously and confidently that Russia's humiliation in the Crimean War (1853-1856) led directly to the emancipation of the serfs and to wide-ranging social, economic, political, and military changes of enormous historical significance. In addition, whether liberal interpreters were waxing eloquent about a so-called epoch of great or Marxists were emphasizing pressures of a revolutionary situation in a country in transition from feudalism to capitalism, the reforms of the Russian army introduced by D. A. Miliutin, war minister throughout most of Alexander II's quarter-century long reign, have been acclaimed unanimously as one of the most successful and lasting attempts at modernization in this period of considerable change. Miliutin was appointed war minister only in November 1861, however, more than six and one half years after Alexander II acceded to the imperial throne, leaving an apparent gap at a time when preparations for reform were begun in most other spheres of government and society. Indeed, the period after the Crimean War is so well known as a time of change of enormous historical significance for the future of Russia that inactivity in the military seems remarkable, especially in the aftermath of military defeat. For a long time this period was examined only in official or semi-official Russian military histories, for example M. I. Bogdanovich's six-volume Istoricheskii ocherk deiatel'nosti voennago upravleniia v Rossii (1855-1880) and N. A. Danilov's similarly titled Istoricheskii ocherk razvitiia voennago upralNeniia v Rossii, volume 1 of the massive Stoletie voennago mninisterstva, 1802-1902 produced by the war ministry at the beginning of this century.' When considering military affairs, survey histories ignored the period between 1856 and 1861 or stated that General N. 0. Sukhozanet, the war minister during this time, failed to understand the need for the reforms subsequently proposed and introduced by Miliutin.2 Even the Soviet scholar P. A. Zaionchkovskii in his classic study of the military reforms during the reign of Alexander II was satisfied simply to castigate Sukhozanet for incompetence. Western historiography has followed Zaionchkovskii closely.3 There are no specialized studies of this period. Receritly,