Abstract

382 SEER, 84, 2, 2006 in specifyinghow these actorsin these circumstancescould have behaved differentlyor might altertheir coursefor the future.Likemany social democrats, he wants a 'Third Way'; but he cannot quite explain what or how. Department of Government University ofEssex FRANCES MILLARD Robinson, Neil (ed.). Reforging the Weakest Link:GlobalPoliticalEconomy and Post-Soviet Change in Russia,Ukraine andBelarus. The InternationalPolitical Economy of New Regionalisms Series. Ashgate, Aldershot and Burlington,VT, 2004. x + I76 pp. Notes. Tables. Bibliography.Index. ?47.50? THE 'weakestlink'in the title refersto Stalin'sfamousconceptualizationof the Bolshevik Revolution as an event that broke the chain of global capitalism at its weakestlink. Publishedexactly eighty years after Stalin coined this definition , supposedly describing Lenin's theoreticaljustification for the revolution , this excellent collection of seven essays addressesthe reincorporationof post-Soviet Russia, Ukraine and Belarusinto a world capitalistsystem. The authors agree in their pessimistic assessment of the 'reforging' programmes, which led in the short run to a catastrophicrecession and a plunge in living standards.In the long run, they resultedin the region'stransformationinto a peripheryof the capitalistworld,which suppliesthe core with raw materialsand provides a marketfor finished goods. The contributorsto the volume, however, advance differentexplanationsfor these disappointing outcomes. Neil Robinson and AnastasiaNesvetailova,the two authorswho go farthest in theorizingthe failuresof economic 'transition,'are both criticalof neoclassical growth theory, which considersforeign investment a powerful source of economic modernization. Robinson, however, blames the Soviet legacy and, in particular, Stalinist over-industrializationand the late Soviet Union's reliance on the export of oil. The firstcomplicated the switch to the production of consumer goods, while the second establishedthe pattern of foreign trade that was characteristicof an industriallyundeveloped periphery.Other legacies of the Soviet command economy included particularisticexchanges, such as barter,and soft budget constraints.For Robinson, then, the fact that direct foreign investment in the region was negligible is not the principal explanationfor its economic fiascoduringthe I99os. Rather, such an outcome was predeterminedby Soviet economic legacies and, most importantly,by an entrenched dependency on energy exports. Nesvetailova,in contrast,sees the global marketeconomy as a majoragent of change in the region, even if its influencewas ultimatelydestructive.Highly criticalof 'transition'theories,she suggeststhat Westerncapitalwas interested in the former Soviet Union primarilyas a supplierof mineral resourcesand a new market for consumer goods. The main social impact of Western economic involvementin the region was 'to sanctifyindividualizedownership at the expense of social equity, to pursue inappropriateloan policies, and to facilitatea corruptbargainbetween owning and politicalclassesat the expense REVIEWS 383 of workers' (p. I35). The Russian financial meltdown of I998 was another consequence of the country's exposure to transnationalmarkets. Instead of large-scaleforeigninvestmentsleading to an industrialrenaissance,the region actuallyunderwentlarge-scaledeindustrialization. If these are indeed the effects of integration into a global marketplace, the Belarusian strategy of economic isolation begins to look attractive. As Julia Korostelevashows in her chapteron Belarus,under PresidentAlexander Lukashenko economic stability depends on continued policies of 'financial repression' and Russia's direct and indirect subsidies. But the preservation of native industries and protection of living standards in Belarus compare favourablywith the developmentsin neighbouringUkraine that are discussed in Marco Bojcun'schapter.Although Ukraine has highly developed aeronautical and machine-building sectors, its emerging global trade profile is that of a supplier of cheap metals, chemicals and food products. The country also suppliesarmsto Asia and servesas a majortransitcorridorto Europefor Russian oil and gas. But during the I990S Ukraine experienced large-scale deindustrializationand registered a record ten consecutive years of output decline to the total of 59 per cent of its GDP. As Nadia Lisovskayashows in her chapteron foreigntrade,Ukraine did manage to redirectits exportsfrom Russia and other Soviet successor states to partnersin Europe and beyond, but over 50 per cent of Ukraine's exports are of ferrous and non-ferrous metals. With Russia and Ukraine establishingtheir niche in the world market as suppliersof raw materials,their economic health becomes increasinglymore dependent on world prices and continued demand. It is a pity, therefore,that most of the authors of this volume do not discuss the spectaculareconomic growth that took place in the region during the firstyears of the twenty-first century. The volume's overarchingtheme is explainingthe failureduringthe I990S, not making sense of the boom during the 2000S. One wishes...

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