Abstract
Mental terms—such as perception, cognition, action, emotion, as well as attention, memory, decision-making—are epistemically sterile. We support our thesis based on extensive comparative neuroanatomy knowledge of the organization of the vertebrate brain. Evolutionary pressures have moulded the central nervous system to promote survival. Careful characterization of the vertebrate brain shows that its architecture supports an enormous amount of communication and integration of signals, especially in birds and mammals. The general architecture supports a degree of ‘computational flexibility’ that enables animals to cope successfully with complex and ever-changing environments. Here, we suggest that the vertebrate neuroarchitecture does not respect the boundaries of standard mental terms, and propose that neuroscience should aim to unravel the dynamic coupling between large-scale brain circuits and complex, naturalistic behaviours.This article is part of the theme issue ‘Systems neuroscience through the lens of evolutionary theory’.
Highlights
Open a textbook on the mind and brain, say Cognitive Neuroscience: The Biology of the Mind by Gazzaniga et al [1]
To illustrate how the semantic separation of mental terms has helped shape the understanding of their neural basis, let us discuss some of the origins of how emotion and cognition are viewed as segregated in the brain
We will develop the theme of intercommunication between basal ganglia loops considerably below, as it plays an important role in the intermixing and integration of brain signals that we suggest blur potential mental categories that can be instantiated by the vertebrate neuroarchitecture
Summary
Open a textbook on the mind and brain, say Cognitive Neuroscience: The Biology of the Mind by Gazzaniga et al [1]. The terms above—perception, attention, etc.—have long histories, and make for excellent chapter headings in a textbook. Do they provide reasonable conceptual anchors for neuroscience (see [5])? We propose that neuroscience should seek to unravel the coupling between large-scale circuits spanning the neuroaxis and complex, naturalistic behaviours and critically how the temporal evolution of behaviour is linked to dynamic brain changes (figure 1b). Barrett & Satpute have developed related ideas, for example, proposing a focus on functionally integrated brain systems, and voicing concerns about standard mental domains Uttal [17] has forcefully voiced opposition to the notion that ‘cognitive’ processes can be localized in the brain; for more constructive views in the domain of, for example, memory, see Fuster [18]
Sign-in/Register to view highlights & summary Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callMore From: Philosophical transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological sciences
Disclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
