Reflexion Processes and Equilibrium in an Oligopoly Model with a Leader

Abstract

An oligopoly model with a leader in the class of linear demand and cost functions of agents is considered, and the dynamic processes of reflexive behavior in this model are analytically studied. Dynamic decision-making processes with the inaccurate beliefs of agents about the choice of competitors are implemented not through the optimal responses to their expected actions, but as repeated static games on a range of admissible responses. Such an approach to decision-making is demonstrated to be justified. Observing the current state of the market and considering current economic restrictions (competitiveness and profit), agents refine their outputs in game-to-game dynamics and take steps towards the current position of their goal. A Stackelberg leader and other agents with the Cournot response choose step sizes independently of each other. Sufficient conditions on the step sizes under which the dynamics converge to an equilibrium are established.