Reflective Equilibrium and Cosmological Claims

Abstract

One significant development of the theory of reflective equilibrium is the distinction between narrow and wide reflective equilibrium. A narrow reflective equilibrium is the coherence between a set of considered moral judgements and a second set of moral principles. For example, we depart from our convictions that religious intolerance and racial discrimination are unjust. We find that these intuitions withstand criticism and elaborate a certain conception of justice that expresses these judgements in a more general form. But what are the consequences of this theory of justice for the distribution of wealth and for authority? We might find some of the consequences questionable and, subsequently, modify our basic principle. John Rawls writes: By going back and forth, sometimes altering the conditions of the contractual circumstances, at others withdrawing our judgments and conforming them to principle, I assume that eventually we shall find a description of the initial situation that expresses both reasonable conditions and yields principles which match our considered judgments duly pruned and adjusted. (Rawls 1971, 20) Norman Daniels amended this scheme by introducing the idea of a wide reflective equilibrium (Daniels 1979). He argues — following certain suggestions by Rawls himself — that a third set of background beliefs is important, i.e. a set of theories, which may include both moral and non-moral theories.