Abstract

In their critique of the Theory of Planned Behaviour (TPB) as a model for human fertility, Morgan and Bachrach (2011) raise a number of concerns that reflect fundamental misconceptions regarding the nature of the theory and its objectives. Their points of criticism demand a response not only because they are misguided and misleading but also because Morgan and Bachrach are not alone to voice them. This criticism is raised with some regularity as a challenge to the TPB’s reasoned-action approach (see Philipov 2011). In fact, in our recent book, Martin Fishbein and I (Fishbein and Ajzen 2010) devoted a whole chapter to these challenges. Some of the relevant issues are dealt with effectively in other contributions to the debate published in this volume. I focus my comments on the criticisms that challenge the basic assumptions underlying the TPB. Although acknowledging certain qualifications, Morgan and Bachrach place the TPB squarely in a class of models that conceptualise fertility as a result of a rational decision-making process. I would first like to put this misconception to rest. It is true, of course, that the TPB emphasises the controlled aspects of human information processing and decision making. Its concern is primarily with behaviours that are goal-directed and steered by conscious self-regulatory processes. In my opinion, and evidently in the views of the other contributors to this volume, fertility-related behaviours are precisely of this kind. The decision to use or not use birth control pills or condoms, to have an abortion, or adopt a child, is neither automatic nor can it be characterised as capricious or thoughtless. Instead, we assume that these kinds of decisions are usually quite reasonable, relying on considerations about the likely consequences of the decision, about expectations of significant others and about possible obstacles. The focus on reasoned action should, however, not be misinterpreted to mean that the TPB posits an impassionate, rational actor who reviews all available information in an unbiased fashion to arrive at a behavioural decision. Importantly, there is no assumption in the TPB that behavioural, normative and control beliefs are formed in a rational, unbiased fashion or that they accurately represent reality. Beliefs reflect the information people have in relation to the performance of a given behaviour, but this information is often inaccurate and incomplete; it may rest on faulty or irrational premises and conclusions, it may be biased by selective

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